Asleep at the wheel: why passive and spouse directors remain a target for liquidators following the High Court’s refusal of special leave in JM World.
07 November 2026 BY NATASHA RIACH & GEORGINA OVEREND

On 5 November 2026, the High Court refused special leave to appeal from the NSW Court of Appeal’s decision in Kim v JM World AU Pty Ltd (in liq); Bak v JM World AU Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] NSWCA 146. The High Court held that the application raised no point of principle and that an appeal would have insufficient prospects of success. That leaves in place an important appellate authority for liquidators pursuing passive directors.

Claims Funding Australia (CFA) is pleased to have funded the liquidator, Barry Taylor, in his successful claims against both directors of JM World AU Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (JM World), for breach of duties they owed to the company. The case has significance for liquidators, particularly in seeking to hold ‘passive’ directors to account for conduct against the interests of the company and its creditors..

The facts

Mr Bak and his wife, Ms Kim, were JM World’s only directors and shareholders. Mr Bak ran the wholesale cosmetics business of the company. Ms Kim had been told she was made a director “just in case” and took no real part in the company’s affairs. Mr Bak signed a building contract in JM World’s name for renovations to the couple’s home, which Ms Kim owned as to 99%. The builder obtained a judgment of $519,473.41 for unpaid building work and wound up the company. After JM World sold a real property it owned, Mr Bak paid $984,096 of the proceeds to three overseas companies, two of which he controlled, and kept $50,000 himself.

Pike J at first instance found both directors in breach of their duties and ordered they repay the company on account of the unpaid building works, secured by an equitable charge over their home, together with the disposed sale proceeds. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, with Leeming JA dissenting on causation.

The passive director: ignorance is a breach

Following Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (2003) 57 NSWLR 113, the Court at first instance restated that every director must meet a “core, irreducible requirement of involvement in the management of the company”. Ms Kim never asked what was happening to the sale proceeds or how creditors would be paid. Pike J held that her lack of knowledge did not help her, because it arose from never taking any role at all. Finding otherwise “would run counter to the well-established law of the minimum expected of directors”.

When a director will be excused

Ms Kim sought relief under ss 1317S and 1318 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). She relied on psychiatric injuries from a 2013 accident, which the experts agreed would have intermittently reduced her capacity to be involved in managing the affairs of the company. Pike J accepted that she acted honestly at all times, but held that she ought not fairly to be excused. Excusing her would prejudice the company and its creditors. In relation to the building works, it would also be perverse, because she had personally benefited from the work done on her home.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found no error in the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion on relief. Black J noted that a director who is ill for a long period, and who neither resigns nor performs her duties, has no strong basis for relief. While Ms Kim’s illness was a significant matter, it was not the case her illness prevented her from knowing she was incapacitated and she had been an inactive director before the accident.

Causation: did the passive director’s inaction cause the loss?

This was the issue that divided the Court of Appeal and the issue pressed in the High Court special leave application. Section 1317H(1)(b) requires that the damage “resulted from” the contravention. The parties accepted that the liquidator bore the onus of proving causation, which requires a counterfactual: what would have happened in relation to the sale proceeds had Ms Kim done her job?

Leeming JA would have allowed Ms Kim’s appeal. In his view, if one director would have caused the loss whatever the other did, the other director’s breach is not causative. Mr Bak controlled the bank accounts and acted in “flagrant disregard” of creditors. Leeming JA was not satisfied that an inquiry or protest by Ms Kim would have stopped him.

Black J (Ward P agreeing) disagreed, for four reasons. First, Ms Kim’s omissions enabled Mr Bak to act alone. His authority depended on her acquiescence. Second, neither director led evidence that her intervention would have made no difference. Third, as an honest director, she would have opposed the payments. Fourth, because Mr Bak was not found to be generally dishonest, he should not be assumed to have lied to her or to have pressed on over her objection. Her available steps also went beyond persuasion: she could have called a directors’ meeting or resigned and told ASIC why. He described a director as a gatekeeper, a role which “provides the context in which questions of causation in cases involving inactive directors should be approached”.

The arguments in the High Court: how to frame the counterfactual

Ms Kim made two arguments. First, the majority had merged breach and causation, contrary to the two separate limbs of s 1317H(1). Second, it had reversed the onus by requiring her to prove that her intervention would have been futile. The liquidator replied that he had always accepted the legal onus. The judges, he said, differed on the facts and the inferences drawn from them, not on principle. He added that Ms Kim had pleaded a positive counterfactual, that the loss would have happened anyway because of Mr Bak's conduct, but had led no evidence to support it.

The real contest was over how the counterfactual should be built. Counterfactuals are among the hardest questions in commercial litigation because the court must decide, on the balance of probabilities, what would have happened in circumstances that never existed: it has to construct a set of hypothetical facts and then infer how real people would have responded to them, often with little or no direct evidence. For a passive director, the counterfactual is built in three stages, and the dispute in JM World lay in the second:

  • Step one: remove the breach. The court imagines that Ms Kim had done what a diligent director should. She would have asked what was happening to the sale proceeds and how creditors would be paid.
  • Step two: decide how everyone else would behave. In Lewis v Australian Capital Territory (2020) 271 CLR 192, the High Court framed the causal question as whether the loss would have occurred had the defendant acted lawfully . In applying this principle to Mr Bak’s conduct, the liquidator argued that if asked a direct question, he would have answered honestly and would not have paid the money away over his wife's objection.
  • Step three: ask whether the loss still occurs. On that footing, the majority inferred that an honest inquiry and objection by Ms Kim would have stopped the payments. Leeming JA built the counterfactual differently. In his view, an honest Mr Bak would have said he was paying what he believed were trade creditors. That answer might well have satisfied her, and he would likely have made the payments anyway. The question is then whether her intervention would have stopped him.

The High Court's refusal of special leave leaves that debate unresolved. While not a ruling on the merits, it is a statement that the case raised no point of principle, hence supporting the majority’s application of the orthodox causation principles to the evidence.

For liquidators, the practical lesson is to plead a counterfactual that explains how the active director would have responded to proper inquiry or objection. The claim should not rest on the active director's misconduct alone, because the more flagrant the rogue director's conduct, the harder it is to show that the passive director could have made a difference.

Practical takeaways for liquidators

  • Passive and spouse directors can be pursued for losses that an active co-director caused. Their inaction can satisfy s 1317H causation.
  • Plead the counterfactual carefully, and identify the steps a diligent director could have taken: for example, inquiry, objection, a board meeting, resignation and notifying ASIC.
  • Relief under ss 1317S and 1318 is hard to obtain where excusing the director would prejudice creditors, even if the director is honest and unwell.
  • Proprietary relief, such as an equitable charge over the family home, may be available where directors benefited from liabilities they caused the company to incur.

CFA funds liquidators to pursue claims of this kind. If you are considering a claim against directors, please get in touch.

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