Asleep at the wheel: why passive and spouse directors remain a target for liquidators following the High Court’s refusal of special leave in JM World.
On 5 November 2026, the High Court refused special leave to appeal from the NSW Court of Appeal’s decision in Kim v JM World AU Pty Ltd (in liq); Bak v JM World AU Pty Ltd (in liq) [2026] NSWCA 146. The High Court held that the application raised no point of principle and that an appeal would have insufficient prospects of success. That leaves in place an important appellate authority for liquidators pursuing passive directors.
Claims Funding Australia (CFA) is pleased to have funded the liquidator, Barry Taylor, in his successful claims against both directors of JM World AU Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (JM World), for breach of duties they owed to the company. The case has significance for liquidators, particularly in seeking to hold ‘passive’ directors to account for conduct against the interests of the company and its creditors..
Mr Bak and his wife, Ms Kim, were JM World’s only directors and shareholders. Mr Bak ran the wholesale cosmetics business of the company. Ms Kim had been told she was made a director “just in case” and took no real part in the company’s affairs. Mr Bak signed a building contract in JM World’s name for renovations to the couple’s home, which Ms Kim owned as to 99%. The builder obtained a judgment of $519,473.41 for unpaid building work and wound up the company. After JM World sold a real property it owned, Mr Bak paid $984,096 of the proceeds to three overseas companies, two of which he controlled, and kept $50,000 himself.
Pike J at first instance found both directors in breach of their duties and ordered they repay the company on account of the unpaid building works, secured by an equitable charge over their home, together with the disposed sale proceeds. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, with Leeming JA dissenting on causation.
Following Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (2003) 57 NSWLR 113, the Court at first instance restated that every director must meet a “core, irreducible requirement of involvement in the management of the company”. Ms Kim never asked what was happening to the sale proceeds or how creditors would be paid. Pike J held that her lack of knowledge did not help her, because it arose from never taking any role at all. Finding otherwise “would run counter to the well-established law of the minimum expected of directors”.
Ms Kim sought relief under ss 1317S and 1318 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). She relied on psychiatric injuries from a 2013 accident, which the experts agreed would have intermittently reduced her capacity to be involved in managing the affairs of the company. Pike J accepted that she acted honestly at all times, but held that she ought not fairly to be excused. Excusing her would prejudice the company and its creditors. In relation to the building works, it would also be perverse, because she had personally benefited from the work done on her home.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found no error in the exercise of the trial judge’s discretion on relief. Black J noted that a director who is ill for a long period, and who neither resigns nor performs her duties, has no strong basis for relief. While Ms Kim’s illness was a significant matter, it was not the case her illness prevented her from knowing she was incapacitated and she had been an inactive director before the accident.
This was the issue that divided the Court of Appeal and the issue pressed in the High Court special leave application. Section 1317H(1)(b) requires that the damage “resulted from” the contravention. The parties accepted that the liquidator bore the onus of proving causation, which requires a counterfactual: what would have happened in relation to the sale proceeds had Ms Kim done her job?
Leeming JA would have allowed Ms Kim’s appeal. In his view, if one director would have caused the loss whatever the other did, the other director’s breach is not causative. Mr Bak controlled the bank accounts and acted in “flagrant disregard” of creditors. Leeming JA was not satisfied that an inquiry or protest by Ms Kim would have stopped him.
Black J (Ward P agreeing) disagreed, for four reasons. First, Ms Kim’s omissions enabled Mr Bak to act alone. His authority depended on her acquiescence. Second, neither director led evidence that her intervention would have made no difference. Third, as an honest director, she would have opposed the payments. Fourth, because Mr Bak was not found to be generally dishonest, he should not be assumed to have lied to her or to have pressed on over her objection. Her available steps also went beyond persuasion: she could have called a directors’ meeting or resigned and told ASIC why. He described a director as a gatekeeper, a role which “provides the context in which questions of causation in cases involving inactive directors should be approached”.
Ms Kim made two arguments. First, the majority had merged breach and causation, contrary to the two separate limbs of s 1317H(1). Second, it had reversed the onus by requiring her to prove that her intervention would have been futile. The liquidator replied that he had always accepted the legal onus. The judges, he said, differed on the facts and the inferences drawn from them, not on principle. He added that Ms Kim had pleaded a positive counterfactual, that the loss would have happened anyway because of Mr Bak's conduct, but had led no evidence to support it.
The real contest was over how the counterfactual should be built. Counterfactuals are among the hardest questions in commercial litigation because the court must decide, on the balance of probabilities, what would have happened in circumstances that never existed: it has to construct a set of hypothetical facts and then infer how real people would have responded to them, often with little or no direct evidence. For a passive director, the counterfactual is built in three stages, and the dispute in JM World lay in the second:
The High Court's refusal of special leave leaves that debate unresolved. While not a ruling on the merits, it is a statement that the case raised no point of principle, hence supporting the majority’s application of the orthodox causation principles to the evidence.
For liquidators, the practical lesson is to plead a counterfactual that explains how the active director would have responded to proper inquiry or objection. The claim should not rest on the active director's misconduct alone, because the more flagrant the rogue director's conduct, the harder it is to show that the passive director could have made a difference.
CFA funds liquidators to pursue claims of this kind. If you are considering a claim against directors, please get in touch.
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